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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Priority No. 2 
v. : 
JOHN PETER KIRILUK, : Case No. 970200-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for criminal homicide, murder, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1996 & Supp. 1997). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant preserve his claim that his murder-related statements were 
erroneously admitted at trial, when he withdrew his motion to suppress those 
statements below and requested instead that only his drug-related admissions be 
suppressed? 
Because defendant led the trial court to believe that he was unconcerned about the 
admission of his murder-related statements, his argument on appeal constitutes invited 
1 
error and is therefore not subject to review. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 
1993) ("A party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing the error.M). 
2(a). Can defendant prevail on his claim that his consent to search was 
coerced as a matter of law based solely on the fact that it was obtained after he had 
invoked his right to remain silent regarding the drug activity in his apartment? 
A trial court's ultimate conclusion that consent was or was not voluntary is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). However, 
trial courts are granted some discretion in applying the legal standard of consent to the 
facts. State v.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). The underlying facts of the consent 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
2(b). Can defendant prevail on his claim that his consent to search was 
exploited from a prior police illegality where the officer requesting consent to search 
was unaware of the preceding illegality? 
Defendant failed to specifically and particularly preserve his exploitation claim 
below and he does not argue any exception to the preservation requirement on appeal; 
therefore his claim is not subject to review under any standard. State v. Johnson, 11A 
P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Even if defendant's argument is deemed adequately preserved, defendant failed to obtain 
a ruling from the trial court. "It is the objecting party's obligation to obtain a ruling on 
the objection, or such objection is waived on appeal." State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961. 
(Utah App. 1989), cert denied 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted). 
2 
3. Did defendant preserve his claim that evidence that a precursor drug was 
seized from his bedroom closet was admitted in violation of the threshold 
admissibility requirements of rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, State v. Rimmasch, 
and State v. Crosby, where defendant did not raise this ground below? 
This issue is unpreserved. Defendant does not argue any exception to the 
preservation requirement on appeal; therefore his claim is not subject to review under any 
standard. Johnson, 77r4 P.2d at 1144-45; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
4. Can defendant prevail on his claim that the trial court erroneously denied 
his motion for mistrial where the record is inconclusive that a discovery violation 
actually occurred and where defendant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced 
by the claimed discovery violation? 
A trial court's decision to deny a requested mistrial based on a claimed a discovery 
violation is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 
(Utah 1987). See also State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) (holding that "the 
denial of motion for mistrial does not constitute an abuse of discretion where no prejudice 
to the accused is shown"); State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995) (stating 
that "[a] trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for mistrial and its decision 
will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that discretion"), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 
(Utah 1996). 
5. Can defendant prevail on his claim that the trial court plainly erred in not 
providing a curative instruction following hearsay testimony that codefendant 
Damon Mumford said defendant slashed the victim's throat, where defendant 
3 
opened the door, and where the hearsay was otherwise admissible as a statement 
against interest? 
Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error claim unless he establishes that 1) an 
error occurred; 2) the error was obvious; and 3) that he was prejudiced thereby. State v. 
Powell 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994), denial ofpost-conviction relief aff'd, P.2d 
, 1998 WL225297 (Utah April 24, 1998). Moreover, because defendant ultimately 
lead the trial court to believe that he no longer desired a curative instruction, his argument 
on appeal may constitute invited error. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. 
6. Can defendant prevail on his claim of cumulative error to challenge his 
conviction, where he fails to establish any prejudicial error occurred? 
Whether the cumulative effect of individually harmless errors requires reversal 
turns on whether the errors as a whole undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Addendum I contains the text of any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules.. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on 26 March 1996, with criminal homicide, murder, a first 
degree felony (R.17-19). Following a jury trial held 29-31 October 1996, defendant was 
convicted as charged (R. 279). The trial court imposed the statutory term of five years to 
life (R. 283). 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arises from the murder of Michael Brown, whose throat was 
stabbed and slashed by defendant on 21 March 1998, after a dispute over some missing 
precursor ingredient to the production of methamphetamine (R. 93 8).l 
Michael's body was discovered lying face up near a tree the next day, in a remote 
and hilly area southwest of Bluffdale, Utah (R. 979). In addition to the approximate six 
inch slash in Michael's throat, police observed that Michael's left eye was blackened and 
that he was missing a front tooth (R. 981). Michael's clothing and hands were covered 
with blood, and there were pools of blood next to the body and on a tree branch lying 
nearby (R. 982). Approximately six feet away from Michael's body were two rocks the 
size of a fist (R. 984). Both rocks had blood on them, and one of the rocks had blood 
underneath it, as though it had been placed there (R. 984, 986). A subsequent autopsy 
revealed additional injuries on the back of Michael's head (R. 996). Also, a tooth fell out 
from Michael's clothing (id). 
Acting on information that defendant was one of the last people seen with Michael 
prior to his murder (R. 713-15, 720), police visited defendant's apartment on 25 March 
1996 for the purpose of requesting that he come downtown to be interviewed (R. 1005). 
Police immediately observed a tree branch similar to the type of tree near where 
Michael's body was found, sitting on a shelf just inside defendant's front door (R. 1006).2 
'Codefendants Damon R. Mumford and Rebecca Mumford, husband and wife, 
respectively, were similarly charged (R. 17). 
2Police also observed in plain view beakers, acetone, and other items which 
appeared to be paraphernalia for the manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 397-98, 403-
04, 430). This evidence was adduced for purposes of the hearing on defendant's motion 
5 
First interview. The station house interview began at approximately 12:45 a.m. 
(R. 1007), and was tape-recorded (R. 366).3 Detective Carr read defendant his Miranda4 
rights, and defendant said he understood them (R. 1007). Thereafter, the detective 
questioned defendant regarding the murder (R. 1008). Defendant admitted being with 
Damon and Michael that night, but claimed that he (defendant) dropped Michael off to 
meet a friend at a restaurant (R. 1008). Defendant said Michael was a drug runner and 
that he was going to do a run for his friend Hogie (R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at p. 13)), add. A. 
According to defendant, Michael was worried that the "Mexican Mafia" was after him 
because they suspected that he had "shorted" Hogie (R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at pp. 20-23)), 
add. A. 
Change of Subject. Shortly thereafter, Detective Carr told defendant that he 
wanted to "change gears" and discuss the drug activity then occurring at defendant's 
apartment (R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at p. 32)), add. _. Detective Carr told defendant that 
during the course of the interview, police had arrested several people who had come to 
defendant's apartment to buy drugs (R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at p. 33)), (see also R. 403-08). 
The detective said that defendant would also be arrested on drug charges (id.). The 
following exchange occurred: 
to suppress the physical evidence seized pursuant to the consensual search of his 
apartment (see R. 72-7'4) (a copy of the motion is contained in Addendum B), but was not 
introduced at trial. See n. 7, supra. 
3
 A copy of the transcribed statement has been made part of the record on appeal 
(see envelope at R. 1204) (a copy is contained in Addendum A). The statement consists 
of two separate interviews. The first interview (1st intrvw.) is numbered from pp. 1-40. 
The second interview (2nd intrvw.) is numbered from pp. 1-15. 
4See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
6 
Det. Can : *, du, Jo you want any, make any statements 
in regards to that. Keep, keeping in mind 
everything about you do have the right to 
i do have the right to have to 
an attorney, things of that nature. 
ueiend_ ou arrestn 
I )"i 1 f\imi mi 01 ;:a) , i ell, it's going c i it ii iside your apartment 
01 :ay? It's your apartn lent as well as CI lai ice's 
apartment, okay? And it's, I, you don't have to 
KiKe any sort of hand to hand buys but 
-r -* iou*.;> when people are coming over there, 
n the cops are there and makin, and may . . . 
\ *w, comin up to do hand to hand buys, 
.. c s somethin going on that you probably 
know about. Okay? And like I said, don't, 
don't, I, I'm not gonna bullshit you on anything, 
okay? And I don't expect you to bullshit me on 
an) thing either, I'd rather you just tell me you 
don't wanna say anything than treat me like I'm 
' Okay? 
Defendant: lad no idea. (Inaudible). 
Det. Can: .;, well, like, like I said, the, the reason 
••'.. :ig, okay? And, if nothin else, respect my 
v. nesty here, 'cause Pn: I n : 1: 
Defendant: 
Det Cai i: : 
Defer idant: 
Det. Carr: 
i : in ir tellin me 
/ou explain it, you explain it. . . 
TV
 not gonna bullshit ya here. That's what the 
call was about, okay? The Sergeant said while 
7 
they were there they've arrested four people 
there. Four people that have come up there, 
tried to make buys, someone came up with a 
bottle of pills, things of that nature, okay? But 
apparently there was some dope found actually 
at your apartment. Okay? Now that in and of 
itself is enough for possession. Bare minimal 
possession. There's not sayin that you're 
dealin, okay? But that's bare minimal 
possession. Okay? And that's, and that's what 
you'd be lookin at right now, so again, do you 
want to make any statements in that regard to 
anything that goes, went on in your apartment 
that has to do with the drugs that were found 
there? 
Defendant: I don't.5 
Det. Carr: Okay. 
Defendant: Okay. 
Det. Carr: Are, are any of those drugs yours? 
(R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at pp. 33-34)), add. A. Defendant responded affirmatively and 
unhesitatingly answered additional questions about his drug activity (R. 1204 (1st intrvw. 
at pp. 33-37)), add. A.6 
5Detective Carr testified at a subsequent hearing that he believed defendant said, "I 
do" (R. 381-87) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum C). 
6By agreement of the parties, none of defendant's drug-related statements, 
specifically, those appearing at pp. 32-37 of the transcribed statement (see R. 1204 (1st 
intrvw.)), add. A, were introduced at trial (see R. 522-23, 527-29) (copies of the pertinent 
transcript pages are contained in addendum E). 
8 
Consent to Search r^ to concluding his questioning regarding defendant's 
involvement in drugs, ueiec. . . carr received a phone call ft om Detecti • e > \ ii iter s. 'Il: 1 : 
was at defendant's apartment and wanted to ask defendant for consent to search (R. 1204 
ii ifc in: II: i 1 ^  I him, that police wanted to search the apartment for drugs (R. 439) D sfei i iant 
said,' go ahead1 (id). Detective W inters told defendant that 1: le did i lot 1: ia\ e to gi \ e 
coi isem: it and that he was free to turn the detective down (id.). Detective Winters also 
si iggested that „ ^ ^ ^ m ^.^ not consent to search, police could obtaii i a warrant based 
on their plain view observations of drug-related items (R 448). 
Oi ice defendant concluded his phone conversation ...... Jetectiv e V V inter s. 
D *t *• :tive Carr confirmed that defendant had consented to i -.*-»rrh of the apartment 
(R 120 1 (1 ; ' intrvw a» :•
 4^, ^ interview eiide^ ^^,iii: uicreafter at 
ap |: i: : •xuAx * lX • ** •'** "iu*'.i ..:.w at p ^)), add. A. 
S e- c ci iiiiiii ill , ne second interview was also recorded and transcr it 2d (R 
1204 (2nd intrv"' n! * • ] 5)), add. A, An approximate 2 hour break prec :::• 1 i :::1 till: le second 
interview, whicii olaitw a*.. *. . - . . JVW. a: . Jetective 
^^* re-advised defendant of his Miranda rights and questioned him concerning 
he ensuing search revealed n ^ii\ur.;-iiLi.: j.iiie, five to six pounds of precursor 
C!
 ,ance, two recipes for methamphi t<)Ar\, hutaine bottles, a lighting mechanism, 
^ware, an address book, mirror, sr i'ksriL pipes, scales, currency, LSD stamps, and a 
magnum and gun holster (R. 44! n n i h physical evidence, the State sought to 
,duce only the precursor and one recipe ior methamphetamine at trial (R. 527 28) 
r M F and (R. 853, 941)(copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in 
n F). See also nn.2, 6, infra. 
9 
Michael's murder (id). Thereafter, defendant gave at least two conflicting versions of his 
activities the night of Michael's murder. 
Defendant first admitted to being with Michael, but stated that he left Michael with 
three Mexicans, by whom he suspected Michael was going to be ,fflicked up" (R. 1204 
(2nd intrvw. at pp. 4-6)), add. A, (R. 1010-1012). At this juncture, a tree branch found in 
defendant's front room was brought into the interview room and Detective Carr observed 
that defendant became nervous (R. 1204 (2nd intrvw. at p. 6)), add. A, (R. 1009). 
Detective Carr confronted defendant with the information that he knew Michael was a 
runner for defendant and that defendant was angry at Michael because he believed that 
Michael had ripped him off (R. 1204 (2nd intrvw. at p. 7)), add. A, (R. 1013). 
Defendant then changed his story and admitted threatening to kill Michael if he 
found that he had ripped him off (R. 1204 (2nd intrvw. at p. 7)), add. A, (R. 1011). 
Defendant also admitted hitting Michael twice, once at his (defendant's) apartment, and 
once while in the truck (R. 1204 (2nd intrvw. at p. 9)), add. A, (R. 1012). Defendant also 
made inculpatory statements against Damon, stating that Damon was the one that took 
Michael "for a walk," and that thereafter Damon returned to the truck and threw a tree 
branch at defendant saying, "Here . . . It's done" (R. 1204 (2nd intrvw. at p. 10-11)), add. 
A, (R. 1014). Defendant said that Damon said he told Michael to say a prayer, and then 
hit Michael in the back of the head before sticking him with the dagger (R. 1204 (2nd 
intrvw. at p. 11)), add. A, (R. 1015). This interview concluded at approximately 4:10 
a.m. (R. 1017). In total, the two interviews, including the 2-hour break, lasted 
approximately three and one half hours (id.). 
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At trial, Detective Can iiitroduced defendant 's inconsistent explanations regarding 
his activities the night of the murder (R. 1008-1015, 1049-53). He also testified that no 
blood was found on either defendant 's or Damon ' s clothing seized several days after the 
mi irder, at the time of their arrest ' n l ' A O 4-1025, 1032). The S; ) 
in: iti: :: • ii i :ed the testivr.• - x following witnesses: 
James Ret k, Michael 's stepfather, last saw him alive on 21 March 
am: i : till: i *i i: i lan (R 1 12-15) It as :1 tm 1: ::: R • *tali :1 :: till: l a t IV lichael 'knew defendant, but it 
•in r e n r o u loKnn. dele ^ roommate, also last saw Michael alive on the 
i ' *' I I">i IIimi „iniiT*i\rcd nt the apnrtmcr'*'• A ' Kl 
saw defei l ::la:i: it. Dai i: l :)i:i, and Michael loadii: ig till: i 11:::: a ::::1 ;:: of a truck belonging 10 L/amon s 
• ife R ebecca (R 735) R ebecca and Chablis Sec: 1:1: ' Hfriend -were ; i ~ ; -
the cab of the iruck \ia.). w ;;-eii J-.\ WI asked where they were headed, defendant said 
thev wore ar - ~ ~ ':••'- i -I ii i n : t s. ^ ei i: l r z\\ l :tant to be with th z others, 
?. i v.:-u ,M\ mi obse r \e that iic had < u iiin: ig 1: ::: ::: till: :i, or that 1: le was otherwise in ji in: 2- ::! at 
•• • ^ v / R ~~" •>. 
an moved into defendant 's apartment around the first of March 1996 (R n^°^ 
She became acquainted with Michael and observed that he spent a lot of time at the 
r~~nment (R. 729; 734) According to Jolynn, Michael and defendant had a "slave-
' J I ill) in in in and di'fendnnl 
relations! m i{ >1 1'l < I S I 
1 1 
master type" relationship with Michael running defendant's errands and performing odd 
jobs like washing and waxing defendant's car (R. 729). 
Jolynn became aware that defendant was angry with Michael the first week of 
March 1996 when she overheard defendant say he was going to kill Michael because he 
thought Michael had stolen the precursor (R. 730, 755). Jolynn heard defendant mention 
the name Hogie and that he (defendant) suspected that Hogie and Michael had "ripped 
him off* together (R. 731). Michael was supposed to give the precursor to Hogie, who 
would then turn it into methamphetamine (R. 731). Around 15 March 1996, Jolynn 
overheard defendant say that "he was afraid for his life because he still owed a lot of 
money" on the precursor (R. 732). While she heard defendant make threats against 
Michael, Jolynn thought they had made up because she knew Michael was helping 
defendant look for Hogie and the missing precursor (R. 733, 748). 
Chablis Scott. Chablis was defendant's girlfriend and spent a lot of time at the 
apartment (R. 758). According to Chablis, defendant and Michael were friends and 
business partners (R. 759). She described Michael as timid and passive and said that he 
ran errands for defendant, cleaned his house and whatever else defendant asked (id). 
A few weeks prior to Michael's murder, Chablis heard defendant talking about the 
missing precursor, and observed that defendant was angry with Michael (R. 759-762). 
Defendant had obtained the precursor for the purpose of having it "cooked" into 
methamphetamine and had given it Michael, who had in turn given it to Hogie to "cook" 
(R. 759-60). Defendant said that the precursor had been stolen, and that he blamed 
Hogie, Michael and himself (R. 761). At the time the precursor came up missing, 
defendant had paid $100, and still owed $500 to the Mexicans he had obtained if from (R. 
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^ n x ^ ^ a b l i s helped defendant, Michael, and others to look for Hogie at a house in 
IXIVCILUU ^IV. 7 6 1 ) . 
1 s
 ib l i s also became acquainted wi th the Mumfords (R. 762) . On the afternoon o f 
_i iviaicii 19 u 6 the \ ! : : m ^ - * Chablis •* s defendant wcr~ s*~-* — + *? ~"~tment (R. 
in -> x T-i.^n<jant asked Chaons id put it underneath a eh-
L *reaft sr I = fe * \ * \ c u • - l% ' : 
tl l ;;::;! • returned with I ii ::!!: lael, the three men ^  living room and argued (id.). - n.j"i!*> 
heard defendant ask Michael * ' fter 
it one half hour, the three men went into defendant's bedroom and closed the door (R. 
; • 3 :>;: ::i , .1 it .1 .- -. ill ^ . - • e 
II: • =: ii: • : : m, followed by defendant, - i \ n g his hand (R. 7o7). \\ hen Chablis 
asked what v ' *" ' * | 
CI lab l is entered the bedroom and saw Michael sitting on the chair rubbing his j a w (id.). 
' 1: : : till: I • i roppe I : i it : • t l t * f l : • : it and "h l ichael p icke :1 it i if • ( : i . ) 
I ' Ill: icn Chablis came out of th = •] l 1 n, defendant and the Mumfords were putt ing 
::: i: it theii :• ::)a:ts (R 1 68) Defer idant sai J 1: l 11 l ::: i is i ii :t R i - ei: ten: I * i lei 2 tl: iej • 
had previously looked for the precursor {K. > ovj . it was Chabl i s ' s understanding that 
theyv^vp. - * tVl< ! ' ^ ^ ! 
i he four piled into Rebecca's truck with the men in back and Chablis and Rebecca 
in tl le cab (R, 770), Once the] • arm '"ed in Riverton, Rebecca asked which way I: ::: tin ii i it (/' i ) 
4 • :cording to Chablis , Damon stuck his head tl: in: ::: i igll: I tl le sliding glass window in the cab 
of the truck and told Rebecca to dxb > e i lp into the 1: lills ( i i) Chablis recalled going past 
the water treatment plant and traveling on dirt roads to a remote area (R. 773). When 
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they arrived at their destination, Rebecca and Chablis remained in the truck and the three 
men got out and walked off a little distance (R. 775). Chablis called them back in order 
to give them a knife which Rebecca had handed her, telling her they had forgotten it (R. 
776). Chablis did not recall whether defendant or Damon returned for the knife, but 
suggested it was defendant (R. 777, 782). Chablis "thought maybe they were going to 
scare [Michael], beat him up, and leave him there" (R. 778). After Chablis handed over 
the knife, the three men walked out of her eyesight and were gone for approximately 15 
minutes (id). Only defendant and Damon returned to the truck (R. 779). 
Defendant and Damon climbed into the cab of the truck and Damon said, "It's 
done. It's over" (R. 780). Rebecca said, "Good. Let's go" (R. 780). Defendant handed 
Chablis Michael's baseball cap (R. 780). Michael's bandanna was inside the cap and was 
tied around some other items (R. 781). Chablis felt the bandanna and it was wet and 
sticky; she could tell that it was wrapped around a knife (id.). Chablis noticed no blood 
on either defendant or Damon (R. 782). 
Back at the apartment, Chablis put Michael's cap on defendant's bed (R. 783). 
She also brought into the apartment, a tree branch that defendant had been sitting on in 
the cab of the truck (R. 786-87). Defendant opened the bandanna and Chablis saw that it 
contained Michael's rings, address book and wallet (R. 783). Defendant said he was 
going to burn them and left to do so (R. 784). He was gone for 5-10 minutes (R. 784). 
Chablis stayed with Rebecca and Damon in the apartment and saw Damon telling 
Rebecca something: "He was doing hand movements with his hands, once across his 
throat, and other hand movements" (id.). 
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w -i defendant returned he laid on his bed and gave Michael's partially burned 
items t~ JUUV instructing mi .n^n (R ) 85) Rebecca said that 
•at is known between us lour is - mora" (R. 788). Rehecca 
%
r\ went to a nearby pai .u5 . v ^ v ^ ^ * in.nj.j u - * > 
1 ;
-ab l i s d id n o t g o t o t h e am ltl it : m: iti ss 1: •  i :ai is i sill: le was scared and l n e " ' t h ^ 
* '— Js anu i III,ii it carried 1 ;: i: ii • z s ai i :i gi n is (R ! 8 / ) CI laui^ aunuiUu 
u w i arrested for p =; sssion on the i ligl it til: lat police came to defendant 's ' - •>. t 
tb~+ iad not been charged for ltl: lat • : f fe use (R. 789 
had not been given any pron lis is 1: ;; ' til: i i police or the proseci u • >. m ) r f ^ u ^ Kit tr> *^»* 
(id). Chablis acknowledged til: lat I: I si f ii st conversation with Detective Carr had c* 
n iccuracies (R, 790-91). Specifically, Chablis had tried to forget what happened, and 
J
 been doing "speed" the m d * murder. ^u >i^ i . - .^a iu Jetective ^aii ^iS 
"was still trying also to come clean on mt u i ^ - hich affected her memoty (R. T Q 1 ) . 
c u
" stated that her tes t imony was more accurate than what she had reported to Detecti - e 
< v-cause she had had t ime to go back over everything (R. 792) . 
On cross examinat ion, defense counsel explored alleged inconsistencies be tween • 
CI lablis 's statement* *~ police, be* - '•mino-* ^ ^ i n a *estimonx T 1 '* ber trial t e s t im^ n v 
(R 799-822). In par t i cu la r • n i LhuOns told L ^ ^ a n tiiat Uetenaant Had stavcu 
i l * ; i 11:1: i :: truck and had not ^ -u ^ci ™ - " " »^) M - u ^ 'R Chablis also 
a. Ji: i iitt ?d wri t ing a letter to defendant whi le he was in jai l whicn srated, n ^ not rlgl it!::,! lat 
- -Ki r s iPS you for t h ^ stupid asshole ' s actions ;;.in"t kill h im, D a m o n did" 
ncd that at the t ime she wrote the letter, ^^ s h o v e d i^a, >amon 
was the killer (id.). Chablis admit ted that she had been concerned about beinu <4v
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with destruction of evidence (R. 801), but that she was unconcerned about being charged 
with possession because she had been told there was insufficient evidence (id). 
On redirect, the prosecutor clarified that Chablis had also told Detective Carr that 
it was possible defendant had walked off with Damon and Michael because she had not 
been watching the whole time: "I did not want to know. I did not want to know what I 
know now" (R. 847). 
Rebecca Mumford. Rebecca, an old friend of defendant's, became reacquainted 
with him in March 1996 (R. 862). She knew that defendant was concerned about the 
missing precursor and that he feared he would be "hurt" because he was in trouble with 
the people he owed (R. 864). She also knew that defendant was angry with Michael and 
blamed him for the loss (R. 866). Defendant asked Damon, Rebecca's husband, to "act as 
back-up muscle" to intimidate Michael (id.). 
Rebecca's testimony was consistent with Chablis's concerning events leading up 
to and after the murder on 21 March 1996 (R. 867-74, 889-891). However, Rebecca 
recalled that it was defendant, not Damon, that directed her to drive into the hills (R. 874). 
She also recalled that it was defendant that asked for her knife and that he then reached 
into her purse and grabbed it (R. 879). She described the knife as a double-edged Gerber 
Dagger which she carried for protection (R. 880).9 After grabbing her knife, defendant 
said, "Come on [Michael]. Let's take a walk" (id.). Defendant and Michael then walked 
away from the truck with Damon (id.). Rebecca watched until the trio disappeared 
9A few days prior to the murder, Rebecca had let defendant handle her knife; he 
"put his finger on the edge of the knife and thumbed it back and forth a couple of times" 
(R. 888). 
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behind a little rid^e (R. 883) - men were gone approximately 30 minutes and then 
^ ^^n and Uelenuani \, .urned (iu ^ a Uiu not see her knife at thi*. 
She remembered ^n the drive back to dw 
°"
ot1ment, which n occn there-earli = i: (R 885-86). 
Back at the apartment, defendant WeiU Mi a i ^ i li iu the bathroom and everyone else 
^ * 'ent into defendant's bedroom (R 886), When defendant entered the bedroom., he put 
Rebecca's knife on a desk (R. 887). Ihe knife wa * *.vet md v. as :n u -heath (id), 
r>..i
 t0\£ defendant that "You don't r a\va> wet \ia > .MIC men wiped 
LIK M :c on her pantb a ' back in l - r defendant 
told them that if "if ar^ . \ -<»u\ ever askci: wcic to sa\ LULU thev "dropped | 
off at the Denny's on J l Freew r ' " R Q'>1 \ 
Rebecca was arrested aloiu - , i several others for possession on 26 March 1996 
(R. 892). She was interviewed h* * . ^ ^ . l r r _ f i :...•:... , ,4-
only what defendant had to > say (R. 892). She e\entuah> oegan to tea, 
detective about going up into the moum * < — . \::j • - her law\ er because she 
1
 "that sometu -t, really serious h (R. 89J>J. Rebecca claimed that she 
did not know that I\ ._ ..iw-.-fdV ! •- " n T - ~ \i ^fendant 
^ * 'ere just going to scare him into JK the precursor (R. 893). 
Rebecca was subsequently < l "d wi*h the murder and testified pursuant to a plea 
orrt
*^ement (1 i exchange for her uruiiilu* ... -.imony. u^ ,n. promised to reduce 
her murder charge to obstructing justice, felony (id.) Independent from 
the plea agreement, Rebecca's p on charge was also reduced to a class A. arA n 
cl large for carrying a concealed weapon without a permit was dismiss-1 T? • ). 
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On cross examination defense counsel elicited that Damon had told Rebecca that 
he participated in the murder by telling Michael to get on his knees and pray (R. 927-28). 
On redirect, the prosecutor further elicited that Damon also admitted hitting Michael in 
the head, but that he claimed defendant had slashed Michael's throat (R. 930-31). 
Scott Spjut Spjut is a latent print examiner for the Department of Public Safety 
(R. 1084-85). He examined Rebecca's knife and found one identifiable print which 
belonged to defendant (R. 1091-1095). He could not determine when the print had been 
made, or how long the print had been there, and noted that it would be difficult to stab 
someone while holding the knife in a manner consistent with the print (R. 1107-09). 
Dr. Edward Leis. Dr. Leis, the medical examiner, testified that Michael had 
likely been knocked unconscious before his throat was fatally slit (R. 1067, 1072, 1978), 
and that the slasher had attacked Michael from behind (R. 1077). He found no defensive 
wounds on Michael's body (id). Dr. Leis further opined that he would expect to see 
blood on the slasher's hands, but because the attack came from behind, this would affect 
the amount of blood, if any, on the slasher's clothing (R. 1076-77). Dr. Leis examined 
Rebecca's knife and concluded that it was consistent with having caused the fatal slicing 
injuries on Michael's neck (R. 1078, 1081). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Murder-Related Statements. Defendant withdrew his motion to suppress his 
custodial statements below and informed the trial that he was only concerned that his 
drug-related statements be excised. Because defendant led the trial court to believe that 
he was unconcerned about the admission of his murder-related statements, any error was 
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invited. In any event, admission of defendant's murder-related statements did not violate 
the prophylactic protections of Michigan v. Mosley or Miranda v. Arizona. 
2. Consent to Search. Defendant's challenge to the validity of his consent to 
search fails because he alleges no Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the fact that the 
consent was obtained after he had invoked his right to silence does not render the consent 
involuntary per se, because request for consent to search is not interrogation in violation 
of Miranda. Defendant therefore presents no valid basis for suppressing physical 
evidence seized pursuant to the consensual search. Defendant's exploitation claim is 
unpreserved, but regardless, he alleges no exploitative conduct on the part of police. 
3. Identification of Seized Substance as a Precursor to Methamphetamine. 
This issue is unpreserved. 
4. Denial of Mistrial Motion. It is not clearly established in the record that the 
State violated its discovery obligations by not providing an alleged serology test to 
defendant. In any event, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny 
defendant's mistrial motion where he failed to articulate any consequent prejudice. The 
evidence demonstrated that both defendant and Damon were at the murder scene; thus, 
the existence of blood on Damon's t-shirt would not exculpate defendant. 
5. Admissible Hearsay. Defendant failed to immediately ask the trial court to 
strike hearsay testimony that Damon said defendant slashed Michael's throat. Defendant 
cannot demonstrate plain error because he opened door to this line of inquiry and because 
the statement was admissible hearsay as a statement against interest. To the extent the 
trial court was later willing to consider a curative instruction, defendant led the court to 
believe he no longer desired the instruction when he failed to provide it as requested. 
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6. Cumulative Error. Defendant has established no errors in this case. He 
cannot therefore prevail under a claim of cumulative error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY ERROR IN THE ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT'S MURDER-
RELATED STATEMENTS WAS INVITED 
Two assertions in defendant's brief require clarification at the outset of the State's 
analysis. 
A. Defendant Never Invoked his Right to Counsel 
First, defendant repeatedly asserts in his brief that he invoked both his right to 
silence and his right to counsel under Miranda, when he stated, MI don't,'1 in response to 
Detective Carr's inquiry whether he wished to make a statement regarding the drug 
activity then on-going in his apartment. See Aplt. Br. at 12, 14, 16-19. The State does 
not dispute that defendant's statement was a limited invocation of the right to silence on 
that topic; however, the State does dispute that defendant's statement additionally 
triggered the right to counsel. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) 
(holding that phrase "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was not an unequivocal request for 
counsel and clarifying that suspects must "unambiguously request counsel. . . sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request for an attorney"). Moreover, in closing argument to the jury, 
defense counsel argued just the opposite, that unlike the other suspects, defendant had 
never requested a lawyer and had cooperated with police in their investigation (R. 1154). 
Defendant's assertion that he invoked his right to counsel and his consequent reliance on 
right to counsel authority is therefore misplaced. See Aplt. Br. at 16-18. 
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B. Defendant Withdrew His Motion to Suppress His 
Custodial Statements 
Second, defendant suggests that he obtained a trial court ruling on the admissibility 
of his murder-related statements. While defendant cites a ruling from the trial court, it is 
not a ruling on the admissibility of his murder-related statements. See Aplt. Br. at 15 
(citing (R. 476-77)). Rather, this ruling was obtained in response to defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the consensual search of his apartment {see R. 72-
73 (motion)), add. B, and {see R. 475-79 (oral ruling)) (a copy is contained in addendum 
C). The trial court ruling therefore evaluates the voluntariness of defendant's consent (R. 
475-79), add. C.10 It does not appear in the record that the trial court viewed itself as also 
considering the admissibility of defendant's murder-related statements (R. 475-79), add. 
C. 
Indeed, the trial court could not have considered the admissibility of defendant's 
murder-related statements because at the time the consent ruling was made, on 16 July 
1996 {see R. 121), defendant had not yet filed his motion to suppress his custodial 
statements, which was not filed until 8 August 1996 (R. 126-27) (a copy is contained in 
addendum D). The hearing on that motion did not occur until 22 October 1996 (R. 227). 
More importantly, at that October hearing, defense counsel withdrew the "Miranda 
motion," clarifying that the motion was "more appropriately a motion for a redaction of 
parts of [defendant's] statement" (R. 521), add. E. The prosecutor responded that he had 
no intent to introduce defendant's drug-related statements and the trial court asked 
defense counsel and the prosecutor to determine what part of defendant's statement was 
10The State's responds to defendant's claims in this regard in Point II of this brief. 
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inadmissible (R. 522-23), add. E. Defense counsel volunteered that he had a transcribed 
copy of the statement and that his objection related only to pp. 32-37 of that statement (R. 
523), add. E. Pages 32-37 of the transcribed statement contain only defendant's drug-
related admissions (see R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at pp. 32-37)), add. A. The prosecutor 
reiterated that he did not intend to introduce defendant's drug-related statements, but 
clarified that he would seek to introduce other evidence demonstrating that defendant had 
a drug-related motive for the murder (R. 527), add. E. Defense counsel agreed that 
motive evidence was admissible, but was concerned only about that quantity of motive 
evidence that would be allowed (R. 528), add. E. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that 
prior drug sales by defendant were not relevant, but that it would allow other testimony 
regarding defendant's drug-related motive for the murder (R. 529), add. E. 
C. Waiver/Invited Error 
In light of the above, the trial court has had no opportunity to consider the 
admissibility of defendant's murder-related statements, and despite defendant's 
representation, has entered no relevant ruling thereon. See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 
14, 16 (Utah 1988) (refusing to consider claim where "record on appeal fails to 
demonstrate that the trial court has been given a fair opportunity to avoid an error"). 
Accordingly, defendant's challenge to the admissibility of his murder-related statements 
is waived, and may even constitute invited error. By withdrawing his original Miranda 
motion and asking only that the trial court redact his drug-related statements, defendant 
led the trial court to believe that he did not object to the admissibility of his murder-
related statements (R. 523), add. E. The policy undergirding the invited error doctrine is 
that the trial court "should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error," and 
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that parties should be discouraged from intentionally misleading the trial court "so as to 
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 
(Utah 1996). Therefore, having led the trial court to believe that he did not object to the 
admission of his murder-related statements, defendant may not now claim error in their 
admission. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("A party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error."). 
D. Defendant's Murder-Related Statements Properly Admitted 
Even if the Court were to look past the procedural bar, defendant's challenge to the 
admissibility of his murder-related statements lacks merit. Defendant claims his murder-
related statements were improperly admitted because they were obtained after he invoked 
his right to silence. Aplt. Br. at 17. The State does not dispute that Detective Can* 
continued to question defendant about his drug activity after he invoked his right to 
silence on that topic {see R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at pp. 32-37)), add. A. Under this 
circumstance, defendant's drug-related statements are suppressible, and the State did not 
seek to admit them at trial (R. 521-28), add. E. However, the detective's failure to cease 
questioning regarding defendant's drug-related activity does not automatically render 
inadmissible defendant's subsequent statements relating to Michael's murder. 
Defendant's dilemma in this case arises out of the fact of the two interviews. The 
Miranda violation occurred in the course of the first interview, on a subject different from 
that of which defendant complains on appeal. All of the murder-related statements of 
which defendant complains were made after an approximate 2-hour break and a fresh 
Miranda warning in the second interview. Regardless of whether Detective Carr's 
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continued drug-related questioning is characterized as a constitutional violation, see Aplt. 
Br. at 18, or as a Miranda violation, in order to succeed in his claim, defendant must link 
the two interviews in such a way that the illegal questioning regarding his drug activity in 
the first interview fatally tainted his murder-related statements in the second.11 However, 
defendant makes no taint argument in his brief, relying instead on Michigan v. Mosley, 
423 U.S. 98 (1975), to suggest that there is a per se bar against further questioning. Aplt. 
Br.atl7.12 
In Mosley, the United States Supreme Court considered under what circumstances 
a resumption of questioning is permissible following an invocation of the right to silence. 
1
 defendant cites no Utah or federal authority for his characterization of the 
illegality as a constitutional violation and the State is aware of none. 
12In any event, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the "taint" analysis 
where the prior illegality is merely a Miranda violation. This may explain why defendant 
does not make this argument. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), an 18-year old 
suspect was taken into custody and, in response to police questioning and without a 
Miranda warning, voluntarily admitted his involvement in a burglary. One hour later and 
after a proper Miranda warning, the suspect confessed. 
The Supreme Court held that although the Miranda exclusionary rule "serves the 
Fifth Amendment," it "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself and 
therefore "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation." Elstad, 
470 U.S. at 306. "The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in 
chief only of compelled testimony." Id. at 306-07. Therefore, the Court further held that 
so long as an unwarned interrogation "involved no actual compulsion," a subsequent, 
warned confession was not "fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 305, 308. There is thus no 
need to demonstrate that intervening events break the causal connection between the 
illegal interrogation and the confession "so that the confession is 'sufficiently an act of 
free will to purge the primary taint.'" Id. at 306 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 
687, 690 (1982) (in turn quoting Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. 590, 602 (1975))). All that is 
required is administration of a. Miranda warning, which "serves to cure the condition that 
rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311. 
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423 U.S. 98, 101 (1975). Mosley was questioned about a robbery and he exercised his 
right to silence after being advised of his Miranda rights. The police ceased 
interrogation. Hours later, a different police officer interviewed Mosley about a 
homicide. The officer xz-Mirandized Mosley and Mosley made an admission. In 
rejecting Mosley's claim of a Miranda violation, the Court held that Miranda could not 
be "sensibly read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further 
questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated 
a desire to remain silent." 423 U.S. at 102. See State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295, 297 (Utah 
1984) (recognizing in a right to counsel case, Mosley's clarification that Miranda did not 
create a per se rule against further questioning on another subject, after suspect has 
indicated a desire to remain silent). The Court therefore concluded that "the 
admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain 
silent depends under Miranda whether [the suspect's] 'right to cut off questioning' was 
'scrupulously honored.'" Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. 
Emphasizing the fact that Mosley had received Miranda warnings prior to each 
interview, the Court determined that Mosley's rights were "scrupulously honored." 423 
U.S. at 106-07. Additional factors the Court considered were that police immediately 
ceased interrogation concerning the robberies, questioning resumed only after passage of 
a significant period of time, and was restricted to the homicide, a crime that had not been 
the subject of the earlier interrogation. 423 U.S. at 106. 
Here, defendant initially waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to police 
about the murder (R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at p. 1)), add. A. He did not thereafter invoke his 
right to silence on that subject {see R. 1204). add. A. When defendant did subsequently 
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invoke his right to silence, he did so only in regards to the drug activity at his apartment 
(R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at p. 32)), add. A. Accordingly, defendant was always willing to 
cooperate with police regarding Michael's murder. Defense counsel asserted as much in 
his closing argument to the jury (R. 1154). 
It is further significant that there was an approximate 2 hour break following the 
impermissible drug-related questioning in the first interview, and the subsequent 
permissible questioning concerning the murder (R. 1204 (2nd intrvw. at p.l)), add. A.13 
Most significant, however, is the fact that following this break, defendant was again read 
his Miranda rights and willingly talked with police concerning the murder (id.). Mosley, 
423 U.S. at 106-07. Under these circumstances, defendant's inculpatory statements 
regarding the murder were not obtained in violation of the prophylactic protections of 
Miranda or Mosley and were therefore properly admitted. 
Defendant's authority does not compel a different conclusion. Defendant cites 
cases where despite an invocation of the right to silence interrogation continued on the 
same subject and without a second or fresh Miranda waiver14 or, where despite the giving 
13In cases where interrogation continued on the same subject, albeit without any 
prior violation of Miranda, court's have found breaks as short as 9 minutes to be 
sufficient. See State v. Shaffer, 292 N.W.2d 370, 374 (Wis. App. 1980) (9 minutes); 
People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 734-35 (Colo. 1987) (45 minutes). See also Mosley, 
423 U.S. at 110 (,f[I]nsofar as the Miranda decision might be read to require interrogation 
to cease for some magical and unspecified period of time following an assertion of the 
"right to silence,'1 and to reject voluntariness as the standard by which to judge informed 
waivers of that right, it should be disapproved as inconsistent with otherwise uniformly 
applied legal principles.") (White, J., concurring). 
l4See Aplt. Br. at 16 (citing State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tenn. 1992), 
cert, denied, Tennessee v. Crump, 506 U.S. 905 (1992), Commonwealth v. Taylor, 374 
N.E.2d 81, 86 (Mass. 1978); Mayes v. State, 571 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Ark. 1978); 
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of a fresh Miranda waiver, interrogation continued on the same subject with no 
significant passage of time between the earlier invocation and the subsequent 
interrogation.15 Defendant's remaining authorities deal with invocations of the right to 
counsel, a scenario which is not relevant on these facts, see Part A, infra, and which 
imposes different strictures on police conduct.16 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981) (holding that police may not interrogate a suspect who has invoked the right to 
counsel unless or until counsel is provided, or the suspect initiates further 
communication). 
E. No Prejudice 
Even if defendant's statements were erroneously admitted, their admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 
1997) (recognizing that State bears burden of demonstrating that improperly elicited 
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). The evidence of defendant's guilt 
was strong. Chablis, Rebecca and Jolynn were consistent in their testimony that 
defendant was angry with Michael over missing precursor (R. 730, 755, 759-762, 866). 
Additionally, Jolynn, James, Chablis and Rebecca all saw defendant with Michael on the 
night of the murder (R. 721, 725, 735, 763, 874), with Chablis and Rebecca placing 
Christopher v. State 824 F.2d 836, 840-841 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
]5See Aplt. Br. at 17 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 1369 
(1978); United States v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
l6See Aplt. Br. at 16 (citing People v. Kleber, 859 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1993), 
Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 A.2d 920 (Pa.), cert, denied, Pennsylvania v. Zook, 493 U.S. 
873 (1989), People v. St. Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 61 (111. 1988), Smith v. United States, 529 
A.2d312(D.C. 1987)). 
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defendant with Damon at the murder scene (R. 775-779, 847, 879-884).17 Immediately 
following the murder, defendant handed Chablis Michael's bandanna which was wrapped 
around a wet and sticky knife (R. 781). Rebecca testified that defendant cleaned the knife 
upon returning to the apartment and gave it back to her (R. 887). Additionally, Rebecca 
testified that Damon told her that defendant slit Michael's throat (R. 930-31).18 This 
Court does not substitute its judgement on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the 
jury. See State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 22 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 
554, 557 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant's murder-related statements were not contrary to the above testimony; 
he did not dispute that he was with Michael the night of the murder, but rather tried to 
inculpate Damon as the sole perpetrator (R. 1204 (2nd intrvw.)), add. A. Defendant also 
did not deny that Michael's murder was drug-related (id). His statements consequently 
corroborated the State's motive theory, and did not go to an essential element of the 
crime. See State v. Woods, 62 Utah 397, 220 P. 215, 217 (Utah 1923) (recognizing that 
proof of motive is not indispensable to conviction. See also State v. Kirksey, 575 N.W.2d 
I7Defendant claims that Chablis's testimony, that defendant walked away from the 
truck and out of her view with Damon and Michael, was inconsistent with her statement 
to Detective Carr, that defendant stayed near the truck within her view. Aplt. Br. at 19. 
Defendant claims that Chablis's statement to Detective Carr exculpates him. Id. 
However, on redirect examination the prosecutor brought out that Chablis also told 
Detective Carr that it was possible defendant had walked out of view with Damon and 
Michael because she did not watch him the whole time (R. 847-49). Therefore, defendant 
fails to show any inconsistency, let alone an exculpatory inconsistency. 
18The State responds to defendant's allegation regarding the propriety of this 
testimony in Point V of this brief. 
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377, 384 (Neb. 1998) (recognizing that "proof of motive is not an element of first degree 
murder'1). 
Based on the above, the admission of defendant's murder-related statements does 
not undermine confidence in the jury verdict. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE CONSENSUAL SEARCH 
OF HIS APARTMENT FAILS BECAUSE HE ALLEGES NO 
FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
In Point II of his brief, defendant claims that the methamphetamine recipe and 
mason jars containing a precursor were improperly seized from his apartment. Aplt. Br. 
at 28. Defendant's claim lacks merit because he alleges no Fourth Amendment 
impropriety. 
A. Consent to Search Does Not Trigger Fifth Amendment/Miranda 
Protections 
Defendant does not argue that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the 
consensual search of his apartment, but rather, that his consent to search was invalid 
because it was obtained in violation of Miranda. Aplt. Br. at 25. Specifically, defendant 
claims that because police obtained his consent to search after he had invoked his right to 
remain silent, his consent to search "was per se coercive" and therefore the recipe and 
precursor should have been suppressed. Aplt. at 24-25. 
The first problem with defendant's argument is that consent to search for physical 
evidence implicates Fourth Amendment, rather than Fifth Amendment/M/ra^da concerns. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 759, 761 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being compelled to 
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testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature").19 Therefore, in the absence of any allegation that defendant's 
consent was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, defendant presents no valid 
basis for suppressing the notebook and the precursor ingredient. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
767. 
The second problem with defendant's argument is that every federal circuit court 
of appeal to address this issue, including the Tenth Circuit, has concluded that a request 
for consent to search is not interrogation which is likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. United States v. Rodriguez-Garvia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir. 1993).20 
"Accord American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1073, 1075 (Utah 1985) 
(recognizing that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only protects 
against compelled testimonial evidence and holding that comparable state constitutional 
provision is similarly limited); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 370-71 (Utah 1995) 
(holding that neither federal nor state privilege against self-incrimination protects 
defendant asserting mental health defense from compelled mental health examination); 
State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d 135, 139 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that compelled 
production of bodily fluids is not protected by the Fifth Amendment). See also United 
States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (1 Ith Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 
1098 (7th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, Smith v. United States, 510 U.S. 1061 (1994); United 
States v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703, 707 (4th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, Vickers v. United States, 
392 U.S. 912 (1968); United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 494 (2nd Circuit 1974); 
People v. Phillips, 594 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Colo. 1979) (all recognizing that evidence 
obtained pursuant to consensual search is real and physical and is not testimonial or 
communicative for Fifth Amendment purposes). 
20See also Hildago, 7 F.3d at 1568; United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1255 
(7th Cir. 1996); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, A1A U.S. 833 
(1985); Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Lemon, 550 F.2d 467,472 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1303 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
30 
The majority of States to confront the issue similarly adhere to this view.21 Under the 
prevailing weight of authorities, defendant's consent was unaffected by the invocation of 
his Miranda right to silence. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d at 1568. Moreover, even 
assuming the request for consent was made in violation of Miranda, a Miranda violation 
is not inherently coercive. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996). 
Consequently, the fact that the consent was obtained after defendant invoked his right to 
silence does not render the consent involuntary per se. Id. Because defendant does not 
otherwise challenge the voluntariness of his consent, see Aplt. Br. at 21-25, his claim of 
coercion fails. 
B. Waiver of Exploitation Claim 
Defendant can only prevail on his claim if his otherwise voluntary consent to 
search was somehow tainted by the preceding Miranda violation. While defendant's 
motion to suppress broadly alleged that his consent to search was tainted by a preceding 
illegality, the prior illegality there identified was the claimed illegal entry of his apartment 
(R. 73), add. B. On appeal to this Court, defendant abandons his claim that police entered 
his apartment illegally, and argues instead that the prior illegality which tainted his 
consent to search was the Miranda violation. Aplt. Br. at 25-28. Defendant did not, 
11
 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 114 Cal.App.3d 67, 76 (1980); People v. Beaver, 
725 P.2d 96, 99 (Colo. App. 1986); State v. Juarez, 903 P.2d 241, 246 (N.M. App.), cert, 
denied, 899 P.2d 1138 (N.M. 1995); Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 1983); 
People v. Alvarado, 644 N.E.2d 783, 787 (111. App. 1994), appeal denied, 649 N.E.2d 419 
(111. 1995); State v. Little, 421 N.W.2d 172, 174 (Iowa App. 1988); State v. Ealy, 530 
So.2d 1309, 1314 (La. App. 1988), writ denied, 536 So,2d 1234 (La. 1989); State v. 
White, 770 S.W.2d 357, 359-60 (Mo. App. 1989); State v. Houser, 490 N.W.2d 168, 176-
77 (Neb. 1992); Mosleyv. State, 643 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. App. 1982); State v. Turner, 
401 N.W.2d 827, 835-36 (Wis. 1987). 
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however, specifically and particularly assert this argument below. See State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989) (requiring "some form of specific preservation of 
claims of error [below] before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal"). 
Even if defense counsel's jumbled statement at oral argument (see R. 472), add. C, is 
deemed adequate to have preserved the exploitation issue, he failed to obtain a ruling on 
the claimed exploitation from the trial court. In making its oral ruling, the trial court 
focused solely on the voluntariness of defendant's consent and did not engage in any 
exploitation analysis (R. 479), add. C. 
"[I]t is the objecting party's obligation to obtain a ruling on the objection, or such 
objection is waived on appeal." State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989), cert 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted). See also Cunningham v. 
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 n.2 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach issue raised below in 
a post-trial memorandum where "[t]here is no indication that the trial court reached or 
ruled on the issue"); State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah App. 1989) (declining to 
consider merits of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence where defendant 
"failed to obtain an oral or written ruling on the motion on the record"); Broberg v. Hess, 
782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that "[w]hen there is no indication in the 
record on appeal that the trial court reached or ruled on an issue, [the reviewing court] 
will not undertake to consider the issue on appeal"). "Without a record of a ruling below, 
[this Court] cannot review the trial court's alleged error." Ortiz, 782 P.2d at 961. 
Therefore, defendant's claim that police exploited the Miranda violation in order to 
obtain his consent to search was not preserved for review. 
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C. Exploitation Analysis Does Not Apply 
Even assuming the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to adequately 
preserve and/or to obtain a ruling on his exploitation claim, his claim is dubious. 
On these facts, defendant's claim that his consent was exploited from the preceding 
illegality really amounts to a claim that, under the totality of the circumstances, his 
consent was involuntary. However, defendant points to no coercive, or for that matter 
exploitative police behavior. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1042, 1263 (Utah 1992) 
(recognizing that primary goal of engaging in an exploitation analysis is to Mdeter the 
police from engaging in illegal conduct even though that conduct may be followed by a 
voluntary consent to the subsequent search"). For the same reasons defendant's consent 
was voluntarily obtained, it was also attenuated from the preceding illegality. 
Here, neither Detective Carr nor Detective Winters is properly charged with 
coercive or exploitive behavior. Detective Carr testified that he believed the transcript of 
defendant's statement was in error, and that defendant had in fact responded "I do," in 
response to his inquiry whether defendant desired to make a statement in regards to the 
drug activity in his apartment (R. 381-387), add. C. The trial court listened to the tape 
recording of defendant's statement and made the following observations: 
[I]t was apparent to me in hearing the text, or the material, that obviously it 
is very difficult to transcribe such a document as this. I did hear it the same 
as you heard i t . . . . And he says, "I don't." And the remainder of the 
context then indicates that he's more than willing to respond. 
(R. 476-77), add. C. Neither the detective's testimony, nor the trial court's observations, 
reflect purposeful or flagrant misconduct on the part of Detective Carr. Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1246 (no deterrent value in suppression where police had no 'purpose' in 
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engaging in misconduct). At most, Detective Carr was negligent in failing to clarify 
whether defendant had stated "I do" or "I don't" before proceeding with questioning. In 
any event, defendant does not dispute that he willingly and with out hesitancy, continued 
answering the detective's questions (R. 1204 (1st intrvw. at pp. 34-37)), add. A. Indeed, 
as defense counsel told the jury, defendant was always willing to cooperate with police in 
their murder investigation (R. 1154). More importantly, Detective Carr was not the 
officer that requested defendant's consent to search. 
Defendant does not even contend that Detective Winters, the officer who actually 
obtained defendant's consent (R. 437-39), was aware that defendant had invoked his right 
to silence at the time he telephoned the station house to speak with defendant. Aplt. Br. at 
28. Defendant does suggest, however, that Detective Winters is properly "charged with 
knowing that [defendant] invoked his rights per Miranda"22 under Arizona v. Roberson, 
486 U.S. 675 (1988). See Aplt. Br. at 17 n.5. Defendant's reliance on Roberson is 
misplaced. Roberson places the burden on police "who propose[] to initiate an 
interrogation to determine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel." Id. As 
explained previously, Detective Winters request for consent to search did not amount to 
interrogation and thus there was no need for the detective to first determine whether 
defendant had invoked either of his Miranda rights before requesting consent. See Point 
11(A), infra. Accordingly, Detective Winter's had no legal duty under Roberson to 
inquire whether defendant had previously invoked his right to silence. 
In the absence of any factual or legal argument that Detective Winters was or 
should have been aware of the preceding illegality, defendant cannot demonstrate that the 
22Defendant never invoked his right to counsel. See Point 1(A), infra. 
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request for consent was exploitative within the meaning of Thurman. Indeed, the purpose 
of the exploitation analysis, to deter illegal police misconduct, is ill-served in this 
circumstance. 846 P.2d at 1263. With no knowledge of the prior illegality, Detective 
Winters obtained defendant's voluntary consent to search. This is not exploitative 
conduct, but is rather a lawful means of obtaining physical evidence. 
D. No Prejudice 
Even assuming the Court determines the methamphetamine recipe and precursor 
substance were erroneously admitted, defendant was not unfairly prejudiced. Neither 
piece of evidence constitutes direct evidence of the murder, but rather both support the 
State's motive theory and help to explain defendant's antagonistic behavior toward 
Michael. As explained in Point 1(D), the State's motive theory was well supported by 
other evidence. Moreover, as further explained in Point 1(D), motive is not a required 
element of murder; therefore, the admission of the methamphetamine recipe and 
precursor substance if error was, even if error, not prejudicial error. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S RULE 702, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND 
STATE V. RIMMASCHCHALLENGE TO DETECTIVE WINTERS' 
TESTIMONY THAT HE BELIEVED THE SUBSTANCE SEIZED 
WAS A DRUG PRECURSOR IS UNPRESERVED 
In Point III of his brief, defendant claims that Detective Winters' testimony that 
the substance seized from his bedroom closet was a precursor ingredient to 
methamphetamine, was admitted in violation of Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, State 
v. RimmascK 775 P.2d 388, (Utah 1989), and State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996). 
Aplt. Br. at 31-32. Defendant claims that this argument is preserved at R. 564-66, 941. 
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(copies of the pertinent transcript pages are attached as addendum F). See Aplt. Br. at 3. 
A review of the record demonstrates that while defendant objected, he did not do so for 
the reasons asserted on appeal. Therefore, defendant's claim is not preserved. 
A. Proceedings Below 
Prior to trial on 29 October 1996, defendant broadly argued that Detective 
Winters' anticipated testimony, that he believed the seized substance was precursor, was 
not relevant under rules 401, 402, and 404, Utah Rules of Evidence, and was more 
prejudicial than probative under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 564), add. F. 
Defendant also broadly claimed that the detective's testimony lacked foundation because 
there was no "documentation" to prove that the substance was indeed a precursor 
ingredient to methamphetamine (R. 564-566), add. F. The trial court overruled 
defendant's objection: 
All right. The objection is overruled. That's not to keep you from making 
the appropriate objection when the evidence to that is offered. But it seems 
to me that a witness who's a seasoned investigator, who observes books or 
chemicals that are consistent with a methamphetamine lab and he's had 
comparative experience with that, should be allowed to testify about what 
he observed. And if you wish to cross-examine as to weight or other things, 
you may certainly do so. 
(R. 566), add. F (emphasis added). 
At trial, the prosecutor inquired of Detective Winters whether any precursor had 
been found at defendant's apartment and the detective responded affirmatively (R. 941), 
add. F. Although he had previously objected to the detective's testimony on the ground 
that it was not established when and where the precursor was found, defendant did not 
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object to the detective's testimony identifying the substance as precursor (R. 938-942), 
add. F. 
Rather, on cross-examination, defendant emphasized that the detective was relying 
solely on his personal "belief1 that the substance was precursor (R. 551-552), add. F. 
Along these lines, defense counsel further inquired: "You didn't do a field test on the 
substance, did you?" (R. 952), add. F. The detective responded that he had, but that the 
test was inconclusive (R. 953), add. F. Detective Winters explained that there was no 
field test for precursor, and that the test he did perform was inconclusive for 
methamphetamine because it took longer than usual to flash: methamphetamine usually 
flashes immediately (id). Defense counsel opined that the substance therefore did not 
flash as an "illegal" or "controlled" substance and the detective agreed (R. 953-955), add. 
F. Defense counsel also elicited that methamphetamine and precursor were found in 
other portions of defendant's apartment and on the person of Jolynn Penrod, defendant's 
roommate (R. 951-952), add. F. 
On redirect examination the prosecutor clarified that the substance was not 
methamphetamine, but was a precursor to methamphetamine, and that the detective's 
testimony was based on his "experience," "knowledge," and "understanding" (R. 955), 
add. F. Again, this questioning occurred without objection (id.). 
B. Waiver 
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that Detective Winters' testimony 
was objectionable under rule 702, Rimmasch and Crosby. Rimmasch, as recently re-
affirmed by Crosby, "sets forth the proper standard for admitting scientific evidence 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 702." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. Rimmasch and Crosby 
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require trial courts to conduct a three-step analysis to determine the admissibility of 
scientific evidence. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640. 
Here, however, the State did not attempt to introduce scientific testing. Rather, as 
emphasized by defendant below, the State introduced only the detective's "belief1 that the 
container he retrieved from defendant's closet held precursor (R. 941, 951-952, 955), add. 
F. As demonstrated above, defendant raised no objection under rule 702 or 
Rimmasch/Crosby to Detective Winters' testimony, nor any timely objection on even 
general foundational grounds (R. 941-942, 955-56), add. F.23 See Johnson, 114 P.2d at 
1144-45 (requiring "some form of specific preservation of claims of error [below] before 
an appellate court will review such claim on appeal"). Defendant chose instead to take 
the tack the detective's testimony was not based on scientific evidence, but was rather 
based solely on his "belief1 (R. 951-52), add. F. By taking this approach, defendant was 
able to elicit testimony that the precursor itself was not an illegal substance (R. 953-955), 
add. F. Because defendant's rule 702 and Rimmasch/Crosby objection is raised for the 
first time on appeal, it is unpreserved. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1144-45. Defendant argues 
no exception to the preservation requirement on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 30-39. Accordingly, 
his allegations of a rule 702 and Rimmasch/Crosby error are not subject to review under 
any standard. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
23To the extent defendant was initially concerned about the lack of documentation 
to support the detective's testimony (R. 565), add. F, he later failed to raise any 
foundational objection to the detective's testimony, even though he had been invited to do 
so by the trial court (R. 566, 942, 956), add. F. 
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C. No Prejudice 
Even if defendant's initial generalized objection is deemed sufficient and this 
Court determines the detective's testimony was erroneously admitted, defendant suffered 
no unfair prejudice. Defendant claims that the precursor ingredient was the only direct 
evidence of motive. Aplt. Br. 38. However, defendant overlooks the methamphetamine 
recipe that was introduced and to which he raises no objection (R. 853, 941-42), add. F. 
Moreover, as pointed out in Point 1(D), infra, the State had already introduced strong 
motive evidence through Chablis, Rebecca and Jolynn. The precursor found in the 
container in defendant's closet and methamphetamine recipe merely corroborate their 
testimony that defendant and Michael were involved in drugs and that defendant was 
upset with Michael over the missing precursor. 
While the detective's testimony may have been insufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the substance was precursor for purposes of a drug prosecution 
case, the testimony was offered here only to support the State's motive theory. The 
parties understood that additional evidence of defendant's drug involvement was 
available, but that the State only sought to admit enough of that potential evidence to 
support its theory that the murder was drug-related {see R. 527-528), add. E. See also 
Statement of the Facts, infra, at p. 10, n.7. Significantly, it was defendant, and not the 
State, who introduced additional evidence that methamphetamine and precursor were 
found in other areas of the apartment and also on the person of defendant's roommate (R. 
951-52), add. F. 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's claim of prejudice fails. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant complains that the State violated discovery in 
failing to provide him with an alleged negative serology test conducted on Damon's t-
shirt. Aplt. Br. at 39. Therefore, defendant claims that he was prejudiced when the trial 
court refused to grant his motion for mistrial. Id. Defendant's claim lacks merit because 
it is not clearly established that a serology test was ever conducted. Moreover, defendant 
cannot show that he ever anticipated blood would be found on Damon's t-shirt and was 
therefore prejudiced by testimony that no blood was found thereon. 
A. Proceedings Below 
During direct examination of Detective Carr, the prosecutor asked if Damon's t-
shirt was among clothing taken to the lab to be "analyzed11 (id.). Detective Carr 
responded that it had been "examined" (id.). When the prosecutor asked for the results of 
the "examination," the detective replied, "After the examination, no blood was located on 
that clothing" (R. 1004), add. G. 
Defense counsel objected claiming that defendant had not been provided "that 
information as part of our discovery, I would like to see that. I hadn't been aware of that 
prior to now, and under what circumstances an analysis had been conducted on the—" (R. 
1004), add. G. The prosecutor interjected that "nothing was found. There's no analysis 
to show him" (id.). When the trial court asked defense counsel to clarify his objection, 
defense counsel stated that he wanted "to see the material where the analysis had been 
done" (id.). The trial court overruled defendant's objection (R. 1005), add. G. 
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Thereafter, during an in camera hearing, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
based on the claimed discovery violation: M[W]e were not informed, prior to today, that 
there'd [sic] been testing done on [Damon's] clothing'1 (R. 1017), add. G. Defense 
counsel argued that discovery requests seeking crime lab material had been filed, and that 
their previous information was that "the clothing was in custody, but had not been tested" 
(R. 1019), add. G. Defense counsel asserted that it was then his understanding that "tests 
have been performed," and it was important to the defense to determine the methodology 
and accuracy of the tests (id.). 
The prosecutor responded that any "testing" was recent, and that nothing was 
found: "There was nothing to get. I have no reports. I've not been given any reports. I 
have no report of that. I think on cross-examination they can determine exactly what 
happened, but there's been no violation because I have no reports to give him" (R. 1020), 
add. G. Defense counsel reiterated that despite the prosecutor's representations, "there 
has to be serology reports somewhere" (R. 1020), add. G. 
The trial court noted that the prosecutor was not previously aware that any testing 
had been done, that any testing had to have been recent, and finally, that defendant failed 
to demonstrate any prejudice (R. 1020-22), add. G. The trial court reasoned that neither a 
positive nor negative serology test result would impact defendant's case in light of the 
evidence adduced that both codefendant and defendant "were in the presence of the 
deceased" at the time of the murder (R. 1023), add. G. 
On cross examination of Detective Carr, defense counsel asked if codefendant's 
clothing had been "tested at the lab?" and the detective responded affirmatively (R. 1032), 
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add. G. Defense counsel then asked if blood had been found on any of the items and the 
detective said "No" (R. 1033), add. G. 
B. Record Inconclusive as to Existence of Serology Report 
Based on the above, it is not clearly established that a serology test was conducted. 
The detective's use of the terms "examined" and "examination" (R. 1003-04), add. G, 
could mean that only a visual inspection was performed. While the detective acquiesced 
in defense counsel's later use of the term "tested," this fact is inadequate to conclusively 
demonstrate that a serology test was conducted (R. 1032), add. G, particularly in light of 
the prosecutor's representations that he was unaware that any serology test had been 
conducted and that no such report had been provided him (R. 1020), add. G. 
Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish the necessary predicate of a discovery 
violation, i.e., that the report in question ever existed. 
C. No Prejudice 
Regardless of whether a serology test was done, the trial court overruled 
defendant's motion for mistrial on the ground that defendant could have suffered no 
prejudice by the claimed discovery violation (R. 1020-23), add. G. See State v. Workman, 
635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) (holding that "the denial of motion for mistrial does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion where no prejudice to the accused is shown"). The trial 
court's ruling is well supported in the record. 
Defendant's theory below was that Damon was the actual killer (R. 1021), add. G. 
Defendant hoped to support his theory with evidence that blood was found on Damon's 
clothing (R. 1021, 1023), add. G. However, prior to trial, defendant had developed no 
such evidence. If defendant assumed that blood would in fact be found on Damon's 
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clothing, he should have requested his own serology test. See State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 
138, 143 (Utah 1994) (recognizing that "defense counsel also has an affirmative duty to 
make a reasonable investigation"). Significantly, despite the fact that defendant knew 
that Damon's clothing had been seized (R. 1019), add. G, he did not seek to have the 
clothing tested for the presence of blood. Defendant cannot therefore claim that Detective 
Carr's testimony that no blood was found on Damon's t-shirt was unanticipated, or that 
he was otherwise misled in a "prejudicial manner." Id. at 141. See also State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913 918, 921 (Utah App. 1990) (finding defendant's case was prejudicially 
impaired by lack of opportunity to prepare for unanticipated testimony that should have 
been revealed in discovery process). 
Moreover, the medical examiner testified that while he would expect to see blood 
on the throat slasher's hands, Michael's murderer appeared to have sliced Michael's 
throat from behind, which would affect how much blood, if any, was on the murderer's 
clothing (R. 1076-77). Thus, the presence of blood on Damon's clothing would not 
necessarily exculpate defendant because as shown in Point 1(D), other evidence including 
his own statements, placed him at the murder scene. 
Because defendant fails to demonstrate that he was surprised by the detective's 
testimony or otherwise prejudicially misled, he fails to demonstrate any abuse of the trial 
court's discretion in denying his motion for mistrial. The trial court's ruling should 
therefore be affirmed. 
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POINT V 
DEFENDANT CANNOT DEMONSTRATE PLAIN ERROR WHERE 
HE OPENED THE DOOR TO ADMISSION OF DISPUTED 
HEARSAY AND THE HEARSAY WAS ADMISSIBLE AS A 
STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST 
In Point V of his brief, defendant complains that the trial court should have given 
the jury a curative instruction regarding hearsay testimony that defendant was the one 
who slashed Michael's throat. Aplt. Br. at 44-46. Defendant proceeds as though the 
claimed error was preserved and alternatively, that plain error occurred. However, 
defendant cannot prevail on his claim of plain error because he opened the door to this 
line of inquiry, and the testimony was otherwise admissible hearsay. 
A. Proceedings Below 
During cross examination of Rebecca, trial counsel opened the door regarding 
what Damon had told her about Michael's murder, specifically inquiring if Damon had 
said that he told Michael to get on his knees and pray, which statement Rebecca 
confirmed (R. 927-28) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in 
Addendum H). 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor followed up by asking Rebecca M[w]hat 
else" Damon had said (R. 930-31), add. H. Rebecca responded that Damon told her that 
"[defendant] slashed [Michael's] throat and then stabbed him in one side and it came out 
the other" (R. 930-31), add. H. 
Defense counsel did not immediately object to this testimony (id). Rather, 
defense counsel waited until his re-cross examination of Rebecca to raise any objection 
(R.934), add. H. Specifically, defense counsel asked Rebecca if this was not the first time 
44 
that she had revealed what Damon told her (R. 933), add. H. When the prosecutor 
objected, defense counsel responded: "If I might just have the benefit of the record for 
just a moment, Judge. The concern that I have is, obviously, that's a hearsay statement. 
We need some way of attacking it. We attempted to try to get that information at the 
preliminary hearing and-" (R. 933-34), add. H. The trial court interjected that, "[t]here 
was no objection made to her recitation of that response when she made it" (R. 934), add. 
H. Defense counsel acknowledged such was the case, and the trial court stated that 
"without objection, the record stands now as made" (id). Defense counsel did not request 
the testimony be stricken or otherwise pursue the matter at this time (id.). 
Subsequently, prior to cross examination of another witness, defense counsel 
referred the trial court back to Rebecca's testimony, stating: "I guess you were correct 
that I didn't object previously when Ms. Mumford was testifying. But I would ask you to 
give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding the statements that came in and were 
made" (R. 942), add. H. The trial court said that he would "do that in the jury 
instructions" (id.). Defense counsel responded, "Thank you" (id.). 
Still later, another in camera hearing on an unrelated matter was held (R. 956-
975), add. H. The trial court asked if any other matters required attention (R. 972), add. 
H. Defense counsel for the first time asked the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard 
Rebecca's statement (R. 973), add H. The trial court reminded defense counsel that he 
had not timely objected to Rebecca's testimony, but that the trial court had invited 
defense counsel to provide him with a instruction later on (id). The trial court asked if 
defendant was moving to strike Rebecca's testimony, and defense counsel responded 
affirmatively (id.). 
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The prosecutor argued that the motion to strike should be denied because it was 
untimely and because defense counsel opened the door (R. 974), add. H. The trial court 
agreed, and denied the defense motion, but invited defense counsel "to provide to me an 
instruction that we can then deal with when when [sic] we finally instruct the jury. 
Maybe we could indicate that they should not consider that, if that's the ruling that 
ultimately seems appropriate11 (R. 974-75), add. H. Defense counsel concurred, stating: "I 
guess you're right. For the record, I would formally make the objection now, and ask that 
you instruct them now. But I understand the court's ruling" (R. 975), add. H. 
After the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court noted that "[t]here was never 
presented to me any requested instruction regarding the issues that came up during the 
course of the trial as to the hearsay. And so that I assume is waived" (R. 1177), add. H. 
Defense counsel said "[h]e had intended with our instruction on the informer/benefit to 
the witness testimony to make that - to make an argument based on that instruction that I 
had submitted" (id). The Court responded, "Okay. And that was never presented. All 
right" (id). Accordingly, this claim of error was not preserved below. 
B. No Plain Error 
Defendant claims in the alternative that the trial court's failure to provide a 
curative instruction in this case constitutes plain error. Aplt. Br. at 46. Plain error cannot 
be shown without demonstrating that 1) an error occurred, 2) the error was obvious, and 
was also 3) prejudicial. State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994) ("[I]f anyone 
of these requirement is not met, plain error is not established."). Here defendant fails to 
demonstrate error, let alone obvious error. 
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1. Defendant Opened the Door 
As recognized by both the trial court and the prosecutor, it is significant that 
defense counsel opened the door to Rebecca's testimony regarding Damon's statements 
about the murder (R. 927-28), add. H. Rebecca's testimony was helpful to the defense 
theory that Damon rather than defendant was the murderer because the statements 
incriminated Damon (R. 927-28), add. H. Once defense counsel opened the door, the 
prosecutor appropriately inquired on redirect what else Damon had said (R. 930-31), add. 
H. See State v. Gayler, P.2d , 1998 WL 195499 (Wyo.) (recognizing that 
defendants cannot complain about evidence admitted as "a consequence of the reciprocal 
nature of the 'open the door' rule1') (quoting Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1148 (Wyo. 
1992)). Accord Franklin v. State, 481 S.E.2d 852,854 (Ga. App. 1997); Edwards v. State, 
530 So.2d 936, 937 (Fla. App. 1988), disapproved on other grounds, 548 So.2d 656 (Fla. 
1989). Cf State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1995) (rejecting claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor implied defendant was guilty based on his 
prior bad acts on the ground that defendant initially introduced the evidence), cert, 
granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). Having opened the door to Damon's favorable 
statements, defendant cannot complain that his less favorable statements were also 
allowed across the threshold. See Fortner, 843 P.2d at 1148; Franklin, 481 S.E.2d at 854; 
Edwards, 530 So.2d at 937. 
2. Statement Against Interest 
Even if defendant had not opened the door, Rebecca's testimony was admissible. 
Rule 804(b)(3), Utah Rules of Evidence provides that where the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness, his statements against interest are not excluded by the hearsay rule. Here, 
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Damon, whose own criminal case was pending, was unavailable as a witness for the 
State. Moreover, because his statements to Rebecca exposed him to party liability for the 
murder, Damon's statements were clearly against his interest (R. 927-31), add. H. 
Because defendant opened the door, and because Rebecca's testimony was 
otherwise admissible, defendant fails to demonstrate any error, let alone obvious error. 
Powell, 872 P.2d at 1031. His claim therefore lacks merit and should be rejected. 
C. Invited Error 
Any error in the failure to give a curative instruction was invited. Defense 
counsel's motion to strike was untimely, coming only after another witness had taken the 
stand (id). See Peterson v. Hansen-Niederhauser, Inc., 374 P.2d 513, 515 (Utah 1962) 
(holding that ,f[a] motion to strike the testimony of witness after he has been examined, 
without objection, cross-examined and later excused without objection is not timely"). 
Despite this untimeliness, the trial court invited the defense to submit a curative 
instruction (R. 974-75), add. H. In thereafter failing to provide the trial court with the 
requested instruction for its consideration, defense counsel led the trial court to believe 
that he no longer found it necessary (R. 1177), add. H. Indeed, defense counsel's 
comments reflect his determination that the trial court's general cautionary instructions 
(see R. 259-260 (jury instr. ## 8-9) and his own argument attacking Rebecca's credibility 
(see R. 1142-45), sufficed (R. 1177), add. H. Defense counsel may well have determined 
that a specific curative instruction would have been more harmful than helpful. See 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah App. 1998) (declining to review absence of curative 
instruction on appeal, observing that trial counsel had a strategic purpose in declining 
curative instruction because he did not want to draw the jury's attention to the claimed 
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improper testimony). Because defense counsel failed to provide the trial court with the 
requested instruction, and consequently led the trial court to believe that defendant no 
longer desired the instruction to be given, defendant may not claim the trial court erred. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 Utah 1993). 
POINT VI 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL 
Even though errors may not individually warrant reversal, this Court may still 
reverse where the errors cumulatively undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
However, for the reasons already argued, no error occurred; therefore, the Court need not 
consider whether the cumulative effect of these actions undermines confidence in the 
outcome. Cf. id. at 350 (finding that the trial record contained numerous, individually 
harmless errors before concluding that the cumulative effect undermined confidence in 
the outcome). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm defendant's conviction for murder. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ffruly 1998. 
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